International Lawyer
Volume 37
Number 2 International Legal Developments in
Review: 2002

Article 7

2003

International Antitrust Law
Oliver Borgers
Gabriel Castaneda
Damian Collins
Ronan P. Harty

Recommended Citation
Oliver Borgers et al., International Antitrust Law, 37 INT'L L. 305 (2003)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol37/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please
visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

International Antitrust Law
OLIVER BORGERS, GABRIEL CASTAIJEDA, DAMIAN COLLINS, RONAN P. HARTY,
MARY HILL, ANDREW M.

PETERSON, EZEKIEL SOLOMON, ERIC J. STOCK,

AND DOMINIC THIRIEN*

I. Developments in Australia
A.

INTRODUCTION

Australian antitrust law came under scrutiny in 2002. The government announced a longawaited review of antitrust provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), by a
2
committee chaired by former High Court Justice Sir Daryl Dawson (Dawson Review).
The Dawson Review's examination of the legislation and the role of the regulator, the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) began in August 2002. The
committee is expected to issue its recommendations in April 2003.1

*Oliver Borgers is a partner, and Dominic Thrien an associate, in the Competition Law Group at McCarthy
Tbtrault LLP in Toronto, Canada. Gabriel Castafieda is the managing partner of Castafieda y Aso6ados in
Mexico City and is the former Executive Director of the Mexican Comision Federal de Competencia. Damian
Collins is a partner with McCann FitzGerald; resident in Brussels, he specializes in EU and Irish antitrust and
regulatory law. Ronan P. Harty is a partner and Eric J. Stock is an associate with Davis Polk & Wardwell in
New York City. Andrew M. Peterson is a partner, and Mary Hill a solicitor, at the law firm of Minter Ellison
Rudd Watts in Auckland, New Zealand. Ezekiel Solomon is a senior partner of Aliens Arthur Robinson in
Sidney, Australia.
1. SeeTrade Practices Act, 1974, Cth (Austl.).
2. See Press Release, Commonwealth Treasurer, Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (May 9, 2002), available at http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2002/
023.asp?pf= 1 [hereinafter TPA Review Committee Announcement].
3. The Dawson Report was in fact released by the Federal Government after the period covered in this
report, on 16 April 2003. Overall, the committee concluded that the TPA has served Australians well. The
TPA has sustained a competitive environment which has benefited consumers in terms of service and price.
The recommendations for reform are designed to achieve certain objectives including:
* greater transparency, speed and certainty for business and consumers in the administration of the
TPA by the ACCC; and
* modernising the TPA to deal with new business structures such as joint ventures and dual listed
companies.
The Committee and the Government have heeded the call by the ACCC and others for the introduction of
criminal sanctions including imprisonment for serious cartel type offences. Importantly, however, they have
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On a separate front, following the collapse of Australia's largest insurer, HIH Insurance
Ltd. (HIH), the Negligence Law Review Panel was established to consider, among other
things, potential amendments to the TPA to limit damages claims for personal injury and
4
death.
The year was also marked by the ACCC aggressively pursuing high profile case and
testing the boundaries of its investigative and enforcement powers. The ACCC launched
an unprecedented number of cases in 2002, with approximately eighty cases still before the
Federal Court. At least eight of these cases are awaiting determination by the High Court,
the last court of appeal in Australia. The ACCC has also pushed for legislative amendments
to introduce higher penalties and criminal sanctions for cartel conduct, and released a
Leniency Policy for public comment.
B.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S REVIEW OF COMPETITION REGULATIONS

On May 10, 2002, in line with its election promise to the Australian business community,
the re-elected Howard government announced a formal review of the TPA.' The Dawson
Review presented an opportunity for business and the ACCC to air polarized views on the
proper scope and application of the TPA. The recommendations of note are outlined
below.'
1. A CCC: Increased Penaltiesand CriminalSanctions

The ACCC submitted that Australia should follow the United States by imposing criminal sanctions for "hardcore" collusion or aggressive cartel conduct.7 In addition to imprisonment for executives and employees involved in cartel conduct, the ACCC recommended
that the maximum pecuniary penalty should be up to three times the value of any commercial gain from the contravention, or alternatively, 10 percent of the corporation's Australian turnover.' While the Business Council of Australia (BCA) has argued that education
and transparency provide better alternatives to increased sanctions, it decided not to oppose
the introduction of criminal sanctions, but rather, to push for greater ACCC accountability
2. Other Issues: Monopoly Conduct and Misuse of Market Power

Section 46 of the TPA proscribes monopoly conduct in a manner equivalent to section
2 of the Sherman Act in the United States.' 0 The legislation presents a significant evidentiary hurdle, for now the plaintiff and prosecutor must show that such conduct is undertaken
both recognised that there is no straight forward way of introducing this into the Australian judicial system
without weakening the effectiveness of the present system, and recommended that a committee should be
established to consider this issue further. There are no plans to amend section 46 of the TPA at present.
4. See Press Release, Minister for Revenue, Minister Announces Review Panel (July 2, 2002), availableat
http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/atr/content/pressrelease/2002/076. asp.
5. See TPA Review Committee Announcement, supra note 2.
6. A complete listing of submissions to the Dawson Review can be found at http://tpareview.
treasury.gov.au/submissions.asp.
7. See ACCC, Submission to the Trade Practices Act Review (July 2, 2002), at http://tpareview.
treasury.gov.au/submissions.asp [hereinafter ACCC Submission to the Dawson Review].
8. Id.
9. See Business Council of Australia, Submission to the Dawson Review of the Trade Practices Act 1974
and its Administration (July 9, 2002), available at http://tpareview.treasury.gov.au/submissions.asp[hereinafter
ACCC Submission to the Dawson Review].
10. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, § 46 (Austl.); Sherman Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C § 2 (1994).
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for the prohibited purpose of either eliminating or damaging a competitor. The ACCC is
seeking to amend section 46 to supplement the current "purposes" test with an "effects"
test, which it argues will bring Australia into line with Europe and the United States."
That is, the legislation should prohibit conduct that has either the purpose or effect of damaging or inhibiting competition. The submission was opposed by groups within the business
community, which claim that the current legislation presents an appropriate balance between fostering competition in international markets and policing competition in domestic
markets.
3. What will be the Likely Outcome?
While the Dawson Review Committee's report will most likely support some of the
proposals of both business and the regulator, the impact of the report is uncertain. ACCC
Chairman Professor Allan Fels is due to resign from the ACCC on June 30, 2003.12 The
change in ACCC leadership could bring with it new modes of regulatory enforcement and
accountability. The government may implement the Committee's recommendations, but is

equally likely to be distracted by international politics and a stagnating economy.
C.

CAN THE

ACCC

REQUIRE ACCESS TO PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS?

In 2001, the ACCC made an unprecedented move of requesting access to communications that were the subject of a claim of legal professional privilege in the course of its
investigations. The move sparked a number of legal challenges as both the ACCC and
companies under investigation sought to clarify the extent of the ACCC's investigative

powers under the TPA. Proceedings were taken all the way to the High Court.
In November 2002, all seven members of the High Court held that the ACCC did not
have the power to demand the production of privileged communications. 3 The High Court
reaffirmed certain well-established principles concerning privilege as a foundation for its
decision.' 4 Privilege was characterized as a common law right or immunity, or even, according to one justice, a fundamental human right.5 The Court further emphasized the
longstanding position under Australian law that a legislative provision will not be interpreted to override common law rights, privileges, or immunities unless it does so by clear
words or by necessary implication.' 6 In this respect, the decision reflects the May 2002
decision of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom in In re Morgan Grenfell & Co. v.
Special Commissionerof Income Tax. "
The Australian decision will have no practical impact on the ACCC's powers, given its
longstanding practice of accepting privilege as a valid answer to a request for information.
It may, however, have wide-ranging implications for other federal regulators, such as the
corporate-affairs regulator and the taxation office, which have similar investigative powers
and that have, on previous occasions, sought the production of privileged materials.

11. ACCC Submission to the Dawson Review, supra note 9.
12. Press Release, Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n, ACCC Chairman, Professor Allan Fels,
AO, to Step Down June 20, 2003 (Nov. 19, 2002), availableat http://tpareview.treasury.gov.au/submission.asp.
13. Daniels Corp. Int'l Pty Ltd. v. Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n (2002) 192 ALR 561
(Austl.).
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. In re Morgan Grenfell & Co. v. Special Comm'r of Income Tax (2002) WLR 1299 (U.K.).
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CARTELS, COLLUSIONS AND THE ACCC LENIENCY POLICY

1. Transformers case
One of the key cartel cases in 2002 involved manufacturers of electrical distribution
transformers. The ACCC brought proceedings against the senior executives of ABB Power
Transmission (in liquidation), and principal manufacturers and suppliers, Wilson Transformer Company, Schneider Electric (Australia) and AW Tyree Transformer, alleging ex99 0
s.
tensive market-sharing and price-fixing agreements throughout the 1
The companies admitted to certain of the allegations and were ordered to pay penalties
amounting to S14.5 million for their collusive behavior." The Court stated that "[it will
19
only be with the imposition of very high penalties that this conduct will be stamped out."
ACCC,
by
the
submitted
the
figures
as
high
as
not
were
Notably, however, the penalties
despite its receiving the benefit of the companies' cooperation.

E.

MERGER DEVELOPMENTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

The year 2002 has also seen some large, international mergers occur, which were subject
to ACCC scrutiny. Some of the significant mergers approved by ACCC in 2002 are discussed below.
1. Arthur Andersen/Ernst & Young
The merger of the Australian partnerships of Arthur Andersen and Ernst & Young was
approved when the ACCC found that the proposed merger would not breach the concen20
tration thresholds in any of the affected markets. The ACCC also considered that Andersen's presence as a strong competitor in the Australian market would likely diminish
2
even if the transaction did not take place. Notably, the ACCC realized that despite the
merger, the merged entity would face vigorous and effective competition from the remaining major accounting firms, as well as smaller global and Australian accounting outfitszz
2. Compaq/Hewlett-Packard
The ACCC did not oppose the merger between global computer providers Compaq and
2
Hewlett-Packard. 1 Despite the fact that the two companies compete in a number of Australian markets, the ACCC was satisfied that the merged entity would likely face substantial
competition from the remaining competitors in the market, namely, large global suppliers
such as IBM and Dell.24 The ACCC also took into account that the information technology
industry was experiencing further growth, and that the proposed merger would be unlikely
2
to dampen technological innovation in this area. "

18. Australian Competition & Consumer Comm'n v. ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd. (No. 2)
(2002) 190 A.L.R. 169 (Austl.).
19. Id.
20. See Press Release, Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n, ACCC not to Oppose Andersen/
Ernst & Young Merger (May 17, 2002), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media/mediar.htm.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Press Release, Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n, ACCC not to Intervene in the Proposed
Merger Between Hewlett-Packard and Campaq (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.accc.gov.au.media/
mediar.htm.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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MISUSE OF MARKET POWER UNDER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

Section 46 of the TPA 6 prohibits a corporation from misusing its substantial market
power for a prohibited purpose such as eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor.
The courts heard several significant cases alleging abuse of market power.
1. Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v. Boral Ltd.

The ACCC claimed that Boral Besser Masonry engaged in predatory pricing in the
concrete masonry products market.27 The Federal Court noted that the introduction of "tilt
up" concrete walling products in the 1980s led to a decrease in the demand for concrete
masonry products and a price war among producers." 8 Despite its relatively low market
share, Boral was said to hold a substantial degree of power in a narrowly defined wholesale
9
market for the supply of concrete masonry products in Melbourne.2
Boral's market power stemmed from its ability to engage in long-term pricing below
avoidable cost. In other words, Boral had deep pockets. The Court's finding came as a
surprise given that none of the traditional signs of market power were present in this case:
there were no substantial barriers to market entry, Boral was particularly unable to impose
sustainable price increases, and it had no ability to refuse to deal.30
Boral appealed to the High Court, which reversed the Federal Court's decision." Boral's
appeal was upheld on the grounds that Boral did not have the requisite degree of market
power." The High Court found that substantial market power required more than a financially well-resourced company in a concentrated market.33 Although financial resources may
point to the existence of market power, the Court also considered both Boral's commercial
explanation for the price-cutting conduct and its ability to recoup its losses at a later stage.14

G. INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION

The ACCC has continued to develop relationships with regulators abroad to foster
greater understanding and to encourage additional cooperation between the Australian
competition and consumer regulatory regime and its overseas counterparts. For example,
in April, the ACCC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Fijian
Commerce Commission." As a significant portion of Fijian legislation governing antitrust behavior is based on the TPA, such links are essential to a cooperative environment
that encourages the sharing of information about such things as law enforcement and
staff training.

26. See Trade Practices Act § 46.
27. Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n v. Boral Ltd. (2001) 106 F.C.R. 328 (Austl.).
28. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. Boral Besser Masonry Ltd. (now Boral Masonry Ltd.) v. Australian Competition and ConsumerComm'n
(2003) HCA 5 (Austl.).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Press Release, Australian Competition and Consumer Comm'n, ACCC and Fiji Commerce Comm'n:
MOU Promotes Cooperation (Apr. 30, 2002), availableat http://www.accc.gov.au/media/mediar.htrn.
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H. Developments in Canada
A.

INTRODUCTION

The year 2002 was characterized by intense legislative reform activities. Important
amendments to the Competition Act 6 came into force in June, and the Government of
Canada issued its strategy for the next round of legislative reform. The Competition Bureau
also continued to enforce applicable merger and abuse-of-dominance rules.
B.

LEGISLATIVE REFORM

On June 21, 2002, the Act to Amend the Competition Act and the Competition Tribunal
Act came into force." The new legislation introduced a limited private right of action before
the Competition Tribunal in respect to refusal to deal, exclusive dealing, tied selling, and
market restrictions. 8 The new right is not automatic: a prospective plaintiff must obtain
leave of the Competition Tribunal in order to bring a case.' 9 In order to be granted such
leave, the applicant must satisfy the Tribunal that its business is "directly and substantially
affected" by the alleged anti-competitive practice."' The Tribunal will not grant leave when
the practice is already the subject of an inquiry or an application to the Tribunal by the
Commissioner of Competition.41 The Tribunal also will be able to sanction vexatious and
improper applications with an award of costs.42 Damages for anti-competitive conduct are

4
not available through this new right of action, and the eventual remedy is injunctive. '
The new bill also established a framework for obtaining and transmitting evidence with
foreign enforcement authorities in non-criminal competition matters. The bill essentially
mirrors the existing arrangements with respect to criminal matters under the Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. 4
In April 2002, a Parliamentary committee issued a report containing recommendations
to modernize the Competition Act. 4' The recommendations focus mainly on reforming the
approach to horizontal arrangements among competitors and amending the principal criminal conspiracy provision found at section 45.4 The Report proposes to create a "twotrack" approach under which hardcore cartels (involving such obvious anti-competitive
agreements as price fixing, market allocation and output restrictions) would now be

36. Competitive Act, R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985) (Can.), availableat http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-34/text.html.
37. Act to Amend the Competition Act and the Competition Tribunal Act, S.C., ch. 16, (2002)
(Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/I/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/govemment/C-23/C-23-4/C-23COVER-E.html.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, R.S.C., ch. 30 (4th Supp.) (1985) (Can.), availableat
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/m- 13 .6/text.html.
45. See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, A Plan to Modernize Canada's Competition Regime (Apr. 2002), availableat http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/3 7/ I/INST/
Studies/Reports/indurp06/03-cov-e.htm.
46. Id. ch. 4.
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classified as per se criminal offences. 4 1 Other horizontal arrangements among competitors
4

would be subject to a civil review.

In addition, the Report recommends the decriminalization of certain pricing practices
such as predatory pricing, vertical price maintenance, and price discrimination. 49 Such practices would, instead, be dealt with under the abuse of dominance provisions.50
In response to the Report, in October 2002, the Government of Canada published its
strategy for modernizing Canada's competition laws.5 The Government indicated that
amending the conspiracy provisions of the Competition Act will be a priority in the next
round of amendments, that it favors the creation of a two-track approach, and that proposed
changes to price discrimination, predatory pricing, and abuse of dominance should be part
of the consultation process for the next round of amendments." The Government will issue
a discussion paper in 2003 addressing specific amendments.
C.

MERGER ACTIVITY

In August 2002, the Competition Bureau announced its intention to increase the
transaction-size threshold for merger notification and the filing fees associated with notification." The Bureau is proposing to increase the current transaction-size threshold of
CDN$35 million for merger notification to CDN$50 million.14 The party-size threshold
of CDN$400 million would remain unchanged.55 The Bureau is also proposing to double
its fees for merger notifications from the current CDN$25,000 to CDN$50,000 per transaction.56 The proposed increases are the first since the current fees were introduced in 1997.
The increases are expected to come into effect in early 2003.11
Once again in 2002, the so-called "efficiency defence" was the object of an important
judicial decision. In April 2002, the Competition Tribunal handed down its decision in
the redetermination of the Superior Propanematter.58 In 2001, the Federal Court ofAppeal
had set aside the Tribunal's initial decision, rejecting its use of the "total surplus standard"
to determine the sufficiency of efficiencies, and had instructed the Tribunal to redetermine the matter taking into account the redistributive effects of the merger5 9 In its

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. ch. 5.
50. Id.
51. Government Response to the Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry,
Science and Technology "A Plan to Modernize Canada's Competition Regime" (Oct. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/vRTF/SpecialReports/Sf le/GoVEResponse.pdf.
52. Id.
53. See Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Seeks Comments on Fee Increase Proposal
and Proposed Threshold Increase for Merger Notification (Aug. 19, 2002), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
SSG/ct02414e.html.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Note: since the writing of this article, the proposed changes referred to have been implemented. See
Press Release, Competition Bureau, Thresholds and Fees for Merger Notification to Increase and Written
Opinions to Become Binding on Commissioner of Competition on April 1, 2003 (Mar. 24, 2003), available at
http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct02536e.html.
58. Comm'r of Competition v. Superior Propane Inc., 2000 Comp. Trib. 16 (Can.), available at http://
www.ct-tc.gc.ca/english/cases/propane/0238a.pdf.
59. Comm'r of Competition v. Superior Propane Inc., [2001] 3 F.C. 185 (Can.).
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redetermination decision, the Tribunal reaffirmed that economic efficiency is the para60
mount objective of the merger provisions of the Competition Act. The Tribunal dismissed
redistribution from
regarding
submissions
for lack of evidence all of the Commissioner's
6
qualitative effects. 1Applying the "balancing weights" approach, which requires some balancing so as to give greater or lesser weight to the wealth transfer from consumers to
6
producers, the Tribunal found that the merger was still saved by efficiencies. The Com63
accept the
not
it
could
that
the
grounds
on
again
missioner appealed the decision once
Tribunal's interpretation that efficiencies are the paramount objective of the merger pro64
visions of the Competition Act.

D.

DEVELOPMENTS

IN

ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

The Competition Bureau continued to increase enforcement of the abuse of dominance
provisions by releasing its Interpretation Bulletin on abuse of dominance in the grocery
65
sector. The Bureau justifies the need for industry-specific guidance due to the fact that
the four largest supermarket chains account for approximately 75 percent of total Canadian
food store sales.- In accordance with the Enforcement Guidelines on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions released in August 2001, the Bulletin indicates that market share of a
single firm that is 35 percent or more, and above 60 percent in a case of alleged joint
67
dominance, will generally prompt further examination. The Bulletin specifically identifies
exclusive agreements, and "slotting allowances" or other listing fees as potential anti66
competitive acts. The Bulletin also indicates that the Bureau will consider allegations of
joint dominance only where a series of facilitating practices, such as category management,
are present in the market.69
E. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

On October 10, 2002, the Stroh Brewery Company was fined CDNS250,000 after pleading guilty to charges of price maintenance in connection with the retail sale of bottled beer
7
products.70 The fine is the largest imposed to date in a price maintenance case. ' Stroh's
supply and distribution agreements with various Quebec retail outlets provided for a

60. SuperiorPropaneInc., supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Appeals Tribunal Decision in Superior
Propane Case (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct02354e.html.
64. Note: since the writing of this article, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed the Competition Tribunal's
redetermination decision in favor of the merging parties. The Federal Court of Appeal's second decision is
available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2003/2003fca53.html. The Commissioner has not appealed that
latest decision.
65. The Abuse of Dominance Provisions as Applied to the Canadian Grocery Sector, Competition Bureau, Nov.

2002, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct02467e.html.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Investigation Leads to a $250,000 Fine in a
Price Maintenance Case (Oct. 10, 2002), availableat http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/ct02435e.html.
71. Id.
VOL. 37, NO. 2

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW

313

volume-based discount program subject to the condition that the retailers maintained a
2
minimum retail price specified by Stroh1

IH. Developments in the European Union
A. EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY COMPETITION

LAW

1. Adoption of New ProceduralRegulation

On December 16, 2002, following a consultation process which began in 1999, the European Community (EC) Council of Ministers, acting on a proposal from the European
Commission, adopted a regulation setting out new procedural rules for EC competition
law.73 The regulation, which replaces Regulation 17 of 1962,74 will apply from May 1, 2004.
The principal innovations introduced by the new regulation are:
* Abolition of the notification system: Under Regulation 17, the Article 81(3) exemption
from the consequences of the Article 81(1) prohibition of anti-competitive arrangements was available only to parties who notified the European Commission and obtained an exemption decision." Only the Commission could grant an exemption.7 6 The

new Regulation abolishes the notification system and the Commission's monopoly of
exemption.7 7
* Automatic application of exemption: The Regulation provides that, for arrangements
coming within the scope of Article 81(3), the exemption applies automatically.7 There
is no notification requirement and parties may rely on Article 81(3) in national courts
and before national competition authorities. 9
* Decentralization and the establishment of a competition network: The national competition authorities will have the power to apply EC competition law in individual cases.
The Regulation establishes a network consisting of the Commission and the national
authorities in order to reduce the risk of inconsistent application of EC competition
law.1° Obligations of consultation are placed on the national authorities, and a system
of information exchange is put in place." National authorities are prohibited from
dealing with cases in which the Commission has initiated proceedings. 2 National courts
may ask the Commission's opinion on questions concerning the application of EC
competition law."
- Simultaneous application of EC and national competition law: The Regulation allows
the national authorities (including courts) to apply both EC and national competition
law, and sets out some rules in an attempt to avoid conflict1 4 National competition law
72. Id.
73. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 Dec. 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1.
74. Regulation 17 of 1962.
75. Council Regulation No. 17, Article 81(3), Feb. 6, 1962.
76. Id.
77. Council Regulation (EC) (No. 1/2003), supra note 73.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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may neither prohibit arrangements that are authorized under EC competition law nor
authorize arrangements that are prohibited under EC competition law.s5 However,
national authorities may apply in their territories stricter national laws that prohibit or
sanction unilateral conduct."6 National authorities also may apply national rules that
predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by Article 81 and 82.87
Enhanced powers of investigation and enforcement: One of the purposes of the procedural reform set out in the Regulation is to permit the Commission to focus its
resources on cartel and monopoly abuse enforcement. In this connection, the Commission is granted new investigative powers, including the power to search the homes
of senior employees of firms under investigation.8 In relation to enforcement, where
it has established a competition infringement, the Commission may impose not only
behavioral remedies but also, in cases where there are no effective behavioral remedies,
a structural remedy.89 The Regulation also allows the Commission to accept binding
commitments from parties without adopting a definitive infringement decision.Breach of the commitments or a material change in circumstances may lead to the
investigation being reopened.9
B. EC

MERGER CONTROL REGULATION

1. Merger Control Reguation-EC Court of FirstInstance-European Commission Merger
Decisions Overturned
InJuly 2002, for the first time since the enactment of the EU Merger Control Regulation,
the EC Court of First Instance overturned a European Commission decision prohibiting
a merger. By the end of the year, two more merger prohibitions had been overturned. These
cases laid to rest any doubts that the EC Courts are prepared to engage in a full assessment
of the facts when reviewing the Commission's merger decisions. Two of the cases were
carried out under the Court's expedited appeal procedure.
a. Airtours v. Commission
In 1999, the British short-haul package holiday operator, Airtours, launched a takeover

bid for one of its competitors, First Choice. The Commission prohibited the merger on
the grounds that it would give Airtours/First Choice and the other two large tour operators

in the market a collective dominant position.92
The Court of First Instance annulled the Commission's decision. 9' It accepted the concept of collective dominance, but it found that the Commission had not proved that the
transaction would actually have an adverse effect on competition? The Court noted the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Comm'n Decision of 22 Sept. 1999 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common

market and the EEA Agreement, 2000 O.J. (L 93) 1.
93. Case T-342/99, Airtours Plc. v. Comm'n, 5 C.M.L.R. 7 (2002).
94. Id.
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elements that must be proved in order to establish collective dominance. It found, in particular, that the Commission had erred in its assessment of the reaction of small tour operators, potential competitors, and U.K. consumers to the conduct of the large tour operators post-merger. 9"
b. Tetra Laval BV v. Commission
In October 2001, the Commission prohibited the acquisition of the French PET equipment manufacturer, Sidel, by the Swiss packaging company, Tetra Laval.9 The Commission
found Tetra to be the world's uncontested leader for carton packaging, with an overall
market share in Europe of more than 80 percent.97 The Commission prohibited the deal
on the grounds that a combined Tetra Laval/Sidel would lead to the creation of a dominant
position. 9 It focused also on the conglomerate effects of the merger (as it had previously
done in its GE/Honeywell decision). 9
On appeal, the Court of First Instance confirmed that it was permissible for the Commission to examine future conglomerate effects.'- However, in overturning the Commission's decision, the Court held that the anti-competitive effects of the merger were overestimated on the markets identified by the Commission. 101 The Court concluded, for
example, that while the merger could allow leveraging to occur, the Commission had not
shown that the merged entity would have an incentive to do so, that is, to put pressure on
carton packaging and equipment customers to use PET equipment produced by Sidel. 1°2
In December 2002, the Commission announced that it was appealing the Court of First
Instance's judgment to the EC Court of Justice. °3 It said that, in its view, the Court of
First Instance had imposed a "disproportionate standard of proof for merger prohibition
decisions."' 1 4
c. Schneider Electric SA v. Commission
In October 2002, the Commission prohibited Schneider's acquisition of Legrand.10" Both
companies are French-based producers of low-voltage electrical equipment such as circuit
breakers, electrical panels, and switches.
The Court of First Instance noted that, while the Commission had concluded that the
relevant markets are national, it had considered the merged entity's position across Europe
and based its assessment of the impact of the concentration on transnational and global
markets. 1' 6 Similarly, the Court of First Instance found that the effect of the merger on
wholesalers required more precise analysis at a national level. 1'" As the Commission had

95. Id.
96. Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel (Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comn/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2416_84_en.pdf.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Comm'n. 5 C.M.L.R. 28 (2002).
101. Id.

102. Id.
103. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Appeals CFI ruling on Tetra Laval/Sidel to the
European Court of Justice (Dec. 20, 2002), availableat http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/press-releases.
104. Id.
105. Case T-77/02, Schneider Electric SA v. Comm'n, available at http://europa.eu.int.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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not engaged in a precise country-by-country examination of the markets affected, the Court
was not convinced by the Commission's views concerning the portfolio effect of the brands
involved. 0 It also held that the Commission's analysis lacked country-specific analysis on
the detailed workings of distribution networks in the individual countries concerned.' °9
The Court said the factual evidence supported the Commission's conclusions regarding
the levels of concentration that would result on French markets."l 0 However, the Court
held that the Commission had substantially changed the nature of its objections to the
merger between the issuing of its written statement of objections (to which the parties had
a chance to respond) and its final decision."' As a result, Schneider had been unable to
propose appropriate corrective measures. The Court held that the Commission had infringed Schneider's defense rights and therefore annulled the prohibition decision in its
entirety."1'
for Reform
2. Merger ControlRegulations-Proposals

In a climate of introspection provoked by the criticisms of its performance contained
in the EC court's judgments in the cases described above, the European Commission,
on December 11, 2002, published a package of measures proposing reform of EC merger
control law." 3 The reform package is the outcome of a process that began in December
2001 with the publication of a Green Paper on the Review of the Merger Control
Regulation.114

"The package consists of: (a) a proposal for a revision of the Merger Regulation; (b) draft
guidelines on the appraisal of horizontal mergers; and (c) a series of non-legislative measures
intended to improve the decision-making process, some of which are contained in a set of
Best Practices."" l5 The following changes were proposed to the Merger Control Regulation:
The Commission proposed new wording in order to confirm that both unilateral and
coordinated effects arising from oligopoly situations are covered." 6 Despite pressure
from a number of Member States, the Commission did not change the substantive
standard by which mergers are reviewed. Rather than introducing the "substantial lessening of competition" standard that was advocated by some Member States, it retained
the dominance-based test."'
The Commission introduced the possibility of notification prior to the conclusion of
a binding agreement and the abolition of the requirement that transactions be notified
within a week of the conclusion of an agreement." '

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Press Release, European Commission, Commission Adopts Comprehensive Reform of EU Merger
athttp://europa.eu.int/comn/competition/press-releases [hereinafter ComControl (Dec. 11, 2002), available
prehensive Reform Package].
114. Green Paper on the Review of Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89.
115. Comprehensive Reform Package, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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" In relation to jurisdiction, the Commission proposed that where at least three Member
States agree, a case that would otherwise fall outside its jurisdiction should be dealt
with by the Commission" 9 (under Article 22 of the EC Merger Control Regulation).
For referrals from the Commission to the Member States (under Article 9 of the EC
Merger Control Regulation), the proposal is that referral requests should be allowed
on the basis that competition would be significantly affected on a distinct market within
the Member State (rather than by reference to a dominance criterion, as is the case
currently).' 20 In addition, both Article 9 and Article 22 of the EC Merger Control
Regulation would be applicable at the request of the parties, who could make their
request a pre-notification stage.' 2 '
" The Commission proposed changes in the timeframe for the conduct of merger investigations, in particular, for complex cases. 22 Where a notified merger is the subject
of an in-depth second-stage investigation, it is proposed that an additional three weeks
should be added to the timetable following the submission of a remedy offer, to allow
more time for the proper consideration of remedies, including the consultation of
Member States.' 23 It is proposed also that with the agreement of the merging companies, up to four weeks could be added to the timetable.114 These proposals indicate an
increasing awareness on the part of the Commission of the high evidentiary burden in
2
cases where it proposes to intervene.' 1
The draft horizontal merger guidelines seek to explain how the Commission will analyze the effect of a merger on competition in a market. It also seeks to provide clarity
26
as to how the Commission will apply the notion of dominance in oligopolistic markets. 1
The draft guidelines provide guidance about threshold limits for market dominance and
also discuss particular factors that could mitigate an initial finding of likely harm to
competition: factors such as buyer power, ease of market entry, "failing firm" issues, and
efficiencies. '
The Commission's Best Practice Guidelines introduce a number of features intended to
operate a "checks and balances" within the European Commission's Merger Task Force.
They include the appointment of a Chief Competition Economist and, in all in-depth
second-stage investigations, the appointment of a "peer review panel" to scrutinize the
investigating team's conclusions.2s

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Comprehensive Reform Package, supra note 113.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Notice on the appraisalof horizontalmergers
under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (Dec. 11, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/review/finaldraften.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Comprehensive Reform Package, supra note 113.
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IV. Developments in Mexico
A.

MERGER CASES

1. Cadbury Beverages Inc. and Refremex AG
A transaction was cleared without conditions when Cadbury Beverages, Inc. acquired the
brands and formulas of Refremex-owned Squirt products in Mexico. 29 The relevant market
was defined as carbonated beverages, including mixers and flavored mineral water, and the
geographic market was nationwide. 30 The Federal Competition Commission (FCC) concluded that there were several other significant competitors in the market.31 Moreover, the
concentration indices calculated for the carbonated beverages market did not exceed FCC
criteria.1"'
2. Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc (PBG) and Pepsi Gemex, SA de CV
Another approved merger involved the acquisition of the capital stock of Gemex by PBG,
through a subsidiary.'13 The FCC reasoned that, because PepsiCo and Gemex already had
partnership links, the transaction should be viewed as a consolidation between an agent and
4
principal. For that reason, no competition concerns were presented."
B.

MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES

In March 2000, the FCC opened an investigation into possible monopolistic practices in
the beer market.," The targets of the investigation were Grupo Modelo, SA de CV and its
subsidiaries.116 Especialidades Cerveceras, SA de CV (ECSA) filed a complaint against Modelo alleging monopolistic practices as a result of Modelo's use of exclusivity clauses for
distributing beer."' Following its review of the matter, the FCC concluded that the alle8
gations had not been proven."
1. Monopolistic Practicesin the Marketfor the Production,Marketing, Distribution,
and Sale of CitricAcid
The FCC declared Archer Daniels Midland Company, Haarmann & Reimer Corporation, and E Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. liable for monopolistic practices in the market for

129. Federal Competition Commission, Cadbry Beverages, Inc./RefremexAG (Feb.20, 2002), athttp://www.
cfc.gob.mx/EnContenido.asp?P = DirResults.asp?txtDir =http://xeon2/cfc0l/Documentos/ing/Resolutions/
Investigations (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Federal Competition Commission, Pepsi Bottling Group, Inc./Pepsi Gemex, SA de CV (July 4, 2002),
at htrp://www.cfc.gob.mx/EnContenido.asp?P=DirResults.asptxDir=http//xeon2cfcOl/Documentos/ing/
Resolutions/Investigations.
134. Id.

135. Federal Competition Commission, PresumedCommission ofAbsolute MonopolisticPractices on the Brewing
Market (May 23, 2002), at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/EnContenido.asp?P=DirResults.asp?txDir=http//
xeon2cfc0 1/Documentos/ing/Resolutions/Investigations.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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the production, marketing, distribution, and sale of citric acid.' 3 9 Between 1996 and 1998,
several companies pleaded guilty before the U.S. Department of Justice for taking part in
price fixing in the international citric acid market.-q
In 1998, the FCC initiated an investigation of possible monopolistic practices consisting
of price fixing for citric acid in Mexican territory. 14 1 As a result of this investigation, the
FCC found that several importing and marketing companies imported citric acid at the
price fixed by the companies investigated, and therefore the international price agreement
had effects on the Mexican market.i42 The FCC determined that Archer, Haarmann, and
La Roche were responsible for the monopolistic practices, and imposed a fine on each of
43
them.
2. Monopolisic Practicesin PublicBids by Health-careSector Institutions
In October 2000, Reliable de Mexico, SA de CV filed a complaint against GPP, Juama,
and Kodak for alleged bid-rigging in the market for the supply of X-ray material to the
government healthcare authorities.The FCC found that in eleven bids, Juama, GPP, and Kodak had coordinated their
bidding activity. 4 The FCC imposed a fine on Kodak and concluded its investigation of
the company with the acceptance of its commitments, which the FCC considered adequate
and economically capable of restoring competitive conditions.' 6 The FCC found that
Juama and GPP were liable for monopolistic practices consisting of the execution of illegal
47
agreements among competitors.
V. Developments in New Zealand
A.

INTRODUCTION

Following the significant amendments to the Commerce Act 1986 4, (Commerce Act) in
2001, and the introduction that year of industry-specific legislation for the telecommunications and dairy industries (outlined in last year's report), 49 2002 was a year of implementation and consolidation for New Zealand's competition regulator, the Commerce
Commission (Commission). The Commission expressed the view that, where there is significant structural and/or regulatory reform in the economy, there is likely to be an associated increase in the number of potential anti-competitive behavior matters that require

139. Federal Competition Commission, Absolute Monopolistic Practicesin the Marketfor Production, Marketing,
Distribution and Sale of CitricAcid (Jan. 31, 2002), at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/EnContenido.asp?P =DirResults.
asp?txDir = http//xeon2cfc0 I/Documentos/ing/Resolutions/Investigaions.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

144. Federal Competition Commission, Absolute Monopolistic Practices in Biddings Called by Health-Care

Institutions (Sept. 5, 2002), at http://www.cfc.gob.mx/EnContenido.asp?P=DirResults.asp?txDir=httpH
xeon2cfc01/Documentos/ing/Resolutions/Investigations.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Commerce Act 1986.
149. Gabriel Castafieda et al., InternationalAntitrust, 36 INT'L LAW. 287 (2002); see International Antitrust,
Developments in New Zealand, 36 INT'L LAW. 300 (2002).
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investigation. It currently believes this to be the case in the dairy, electricity and telecommunications industries, which has prompted closer scrutiny of those sectors in 2002. Despite
a reduction in merger activity for 2002, of the twenty-eight applications filed with the
Commission requesting clearance of business acquisitions, only one was declined (nineteen
were cleared, with the balance either withdrawn or pending).
B.

REGULATORY CONTROL

1. Electricity
In 1998, legislative reform required the separation of electricity generation and retail
businesses from transmission and distribution (lines) businesses. The responsibility for the
regulation of lines businesses was devolved to the Commission last year, with the object of
developing a "targeted control" regime. 50 The regime is intended for the long-term benefit
of consumers, through ensuring that suppliers "are limited in their ability to extract excessive profits, [that suppliers] face strong incentives to improve efficiency and provide services
at a quality that reflects consumer demands, and [that suppliers] share the benefits of efficiency gains with consumers, including through lower prices."'' The Commission's primary responsibilities include the development of thresholds for the declaration of control
of lines services, determining whether to declare control and, if necessary, taking control.
This process has involved a comprehensive review by the Commission of asset valuation
methodologies and an audit of the asset valuations of twenty-nine lines businesses, which
culminated in the release of a discussion paper on October 1, 2002.152
In a series of draft decisions released on December 23, 2002, the Commission noted its
intention to set three thresholds against which lines businesses will be assessed, to determine
whether the objectives of the Act are being met.5 3 Those thresholds are a "price path"
threshold (which a lines business would breach if its prices were to rise in any year by more
than CPI inflation less an efficiency factor); a "quality" threshold (which focuses on reliability over time); and an "excess profit" threshold (based on a specified WACC-based rate
54
of return on investment).
The Commission also authorized an application by the Electricity Governance Board
(EGB), an industry body comprised of elected representatives of generators, purchasers,
distributors, grid owners, and consumers, to enter into and give effect to an arrangement
that had the potential to breach certain restrictive trade practice provisions of the Commerce Act. The arrangement, which proposes to restructure and rationalize the basis under
which electricity is traded and delivered, represents the industry response to the government

150. New Zealand Commerce Commission, Review ofAsset Valuation Methodologies:Electricity Lines Businesses'
System Fixed Assets, Discussion Paper (Oct. 1,2002), at http://www.comcom.govt.nx/electricity/pdfs/
dDiscussion%20Paper% 20-%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Valuation
%20Methodologies%201%200ctober%202002.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. SeeNew Zealand Commerce Commission, Regulation of Electricity Lines Businesses, Targeted Control
Regime, Draft Decisions (Dec. 23, 2002), at http://www.comcom.govt.nz/electricity/pdfs/Draft%20Paper
%2023%2ODec%202002.pdf.
154. Id.
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policy that the industry, rather than the government, develop an improved basis for the
trading and delivery of electricity.
2. Dairy
156
As explained in last year's report,' 5 the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001 (DIRA),
which authorized the creation of dairy co-operative Fonterra (New Zealand's largest company), gives the Commission the power to determine disputes between Fonterra and other
parties concerning the interpretation of the DIRA and regulations made under it. In September 2002, the Commission decided to adjudicate the first dispute referred to it under
the DIRA, between Fonterra and Independent Dairy Producers Ltd. (IDP), relating to the
price at which Fonterra supplies raw milk to IDP. A draft determination is due in early
2003. The Commission's powers to investigate and determine disputes under the DIRA
are very broad and include many of its powers under the Commerce Act. It is not bound
by technicalities, legal forms, or rules of evidence.

3. Airports

The Commission also completed its first regulatory control inquiry on whether regulatory control of airfield activities is required at New Zealand's three major international
airports. The inquiry resulted in a recommendation to the government that Auckland International Airport be controlled." 7
C. MERGER ACTIVITY

The Commission's statistics for the first part of 2002 showed a reduction in the number
of merger clearance applications, reflecting a general decline in the level of merger and

acquisition activity in the market. The Commission granted clearance to all but one of the
business acquisitions referred to it in 2002, including acquisitions by Hewlett-Packard
Company of Compaq Computer Corporation, and a merger of the cinema advertising
businesses of Val Morgan & Co (Austl.) Pty Ltd. (related to The Hoyts Corporation Pty
Ltd. and Village Cinema Australia Pty Ltd.) and Media Entertainment Group Ltd. The
Commission will be busy, however, during 2003 dealing with joint applications filed by Air
New Zealand and Qantas in December 2002.15s The applications are for market behavior
and structure authorizations under the Commerce Act, relating, respectively, to a strategic
alliance arrangement and a subscription by Qantas for up to 22.5 percent of Air New
Zealand's voting equity. The deal is subject to the approval of both the New Zealand
Commerce Commission and its Australian equivalent (the ACCC) and is likely to involve
a close examination of the impact of the proposals on the domestic, trans-Tasman and transPacific aviation markets.

155. Castafieda et al., supra note 149.

156. Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001.
157. New Zealand Commerce Commission, Final Report, Part IV Inquiry into Airfield Activities at Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch International Airports (Aug. 1, 2002), at http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/
bus-pol/airports-full.pdf.
158. New Zealand Commerce Commission, Air New Zealand/Qantas - Applications for Authorizations, at
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/adjudication/qantasairnz.cfn.
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ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

1. The Supermarkets Case-Progressive!Woolworths
As anticipated by last year's report,' 59 the Progressive supermarket chain appealed to the
Privy Council against the decision of the Court of Appeal that the Commission should have
applied the new test of "a substantial lessening of competition" (SLC) when considering
Progressive's application to acquire the Woolworths supermarket chain. The proceedings
arose due to the absence of any transitional provisions governing the new test. Following
the Commission's decision to determine Progressive's application under the test at the time
the application was filed (the old test of market dominance), a competitor of Progressive,
Foodstuffs, brought proceedings in the High Court seeking a finding that the new SLC
test (considered to be a higher threshold than the old test) should apply. Progressive favored
a finding that the old test should have applied. This is not surprising since the Commission
declined to grant clearance under the new SLC test, on the basis that the market exhibited
characteristics likely to facilitate "tacit collusion" between competitors, whereas it had
cleared the merger on the basis of the old dominance test. The High Court agreed with
Progressive that the old dominance test should apply, although the finding was overturned
by the Court of Appeal. However, Progressive's appeal to the Privy Council was successful,
with the Privy Council finding that "a logical and fair transition" to the new test is achieved
through including applications for clearance under the Commerce Act within the concept
of a "proceeding" in terms of governing statutory interpretation legislation. Therefore,
proceedings that are commenced prior to a legislative amendment are to be considered
under the legislative provisions applicable at the time they were commenced.
VI. Developments in the United States
A.

PROCEDURAL LAW

In 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Kruman v. Christie'sInt'l
PLC, ruled that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA)160 permits U.S.
courts to assert jurisdiction over antitrust claims that arise out of unlawful conduct with a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. 161Jurisdiction may
be asserted even where the claim itself is not based on the conduct's effect on the United
States. 6 The case arose out of an alleged conspiracy between defendants Sotheby's and
Christie's (U.S. and U.K-based auction houses) to fix prices for their services at auctions
in the United States and the United Kingdom. The plaintiffs, who alleged that they had
paid inflated commissions in auctions outside of the United States, were permitted to proceed with their claim, despite the fact that the conspiracy's alleged effects on the United
States did not give rise to the plaintiffs' claim. 163There is now a split of authority in the
United States on this issue.I&'

159. Castafteda et al., supranote 149.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).

161. See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 399-400 (2d Cir. 2002).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 389. The defendants had already settled with the plaintiffs who purchased or sold goods in U.S.
auctions. Id.
164. See, e.g., Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2001), cert.
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In Dee-K Enterprises,Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bd., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that U.S. consumers could not assert Sherman Act claims against alleged participants in an international price-fixing conspiracy that primarily involved foreign conduct
without a substantial effect in the United States.16 The case involved an alleged price-fixing
conspiracy among foreign rubber thread manufacturers, who sold their products in a number of countries, including the United States. The court held that because the price-fixing
conspiracy consisted of "primarily foreign" conduct, the standard for whether or not the
alleged conduct could violate the Sherman Act was whether the conduct was intended to
and did produce some substantial effect in the United States (the standard of HartfordFire
Ins. Co. v. California'66).67The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the Hartford
Fire standard applies only to "wholly foreign" conduct, and instead found it appropriate to
engage in a more "flexible inquiry" in order to determine whether the conduct was "foreign
conduct" subject to Hartford Fire. The court considered whether "the participants, acts,
targets, and effects involved in [the] asserted antitrust violation [were] primarily foreign or
6
primarily domestic." s

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel
Corp., 69 ruled that an investigation by the Directorate General for Competition (the Directorate), a "sub-unit" of the European Commission (EC), qualifies as a proceeding before
a "foreign tribunal" for the purposes of a federal court's authority, pursuant to Section 1782
of the Judicial Code," 0 to order discovery from a person within its jurisdiction for use in a
foreign proceeding. 7' The court rejected Intel's argument that the investigation by the
Directorate of a complaint filed by Advanced Micro Devices alleging that Intel had abused
its dominant position in Europe in violation of Article 82 of the EC Treaty" 2 was merely

denied, 122 S.Ct. 1059 (2002); see also General Elec. Co. v. Latin American Imports S.A., Civil Action No. 9992, 2002 WL 1603093 at *5(W.D. Ky. July 16, 2002) (holding that, under the FTAIA, a distributor of GE's
products in Peru could not assert a Sherman Act claim against GE for failing to renew the distribution agreement because the distributor had not shown a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on the
domestic marketplace and that this anticompetitive effect on the domestic marketplace gave rise to [its]
injuries").
165. Dee-K Enter. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002).
166. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). Because the case involved import
commerce, which isexempted from the FTAIA, the FTAIA standard did not apply; see Dee-K Enter., 299 F.3d
at 287.
167. Dee-K Enter., 299 F.3d at 285-86.
168. Id. at 285, 292-95. Because (i) the "bulk" of the conduct related to the conspiracy occurred abroad,
(ii) the agreements were formed outside the United States, (iii) the target of the conspiracy was aglobal market,
and (iv) only two of the dozens of individual participants were officers in U.S. companies, the court concluded
that the conduct was primarily foreign. Id. at 294-95. Because the conduct was primarily foreign, and the jury
in the lower court had found that the conspiracy had no substantial effect on U.S. commerce, the court affirmed
the judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at 285, 296.
169. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002).
170. 28 U.S.C. §1782 (2000).
171. Advanced Micro Devices, supra note 169, at 666. The appeals court found that because (1)
the Directorate
makes recommendations to the EC, whose decisions are binding and enforceable under EC law, and
(2) the EC's decisions are appealable to the EC's Court of First Instance, the proceeding for which AMD
sought discovery was "at minimum, one leading to quasi-judicial proceedings." Id. at 667-68. The court also
refused to impose an absolute requirement that the information sought in the discovery request be discoverable
in the EC proceeding. Id. at 668-69.
172. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S 11,as amended byTreaty
of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 1,reprintedin 37 I.L.M 56 (1998).
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an administrative process to determine whether to recommend that the EC proceed with
a complaint, not a "proceeding" before a "foreign tribunal."' 3 In addition, two federal
courts held that a plaintiff was entitled to jurisdictional discovery from a foreign defendant
to support its allegations of jurisdiction over the defendant."
B.

CARTEL ENFORCEMENT

In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) continued to engage in criminal investigations of foreign companies and individuals involved in cartel behavior affecting the U.S.
market.
DOJ investigations continued to result in significant fines for foreign companies accused
of forming cartels in violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. Bilhar International Establishment,
a company based in Liechtenstein, was fined $54 million after pleading guilty to participation in a conspiracy to rig bids and to defraud the U.S. Agency for International Development in the Arab Republic of Egypt."' Luxembourg-based Arteva Specialties, S.a.r.l.
(d/b/a KoSa), was fined $28.5 million after pleading guilty to participation in a conspiracy
to fix prices and allocate customers in the polyester staple industry. 7 6 Other examples of
the DOJ's international reach include agreement by French-based Elf Atochem S.A. to
plead guilty and pay fines totaling $8.5 million for participating in two international conspiracies that suppressed competition in the industrial chemical markets for monochloroacetic acid (MCAA) and organic peroxides,'" and the plea agreements by Nippon Electrode Company Ltd. (Japan) and VAW Carbon GmbH (Germany) subjecting them to $1.44
million in fines for participating in an international conspiracy to fix the price of carbon
cathode block.'
The DOJ also took action against foreign companies allegedly interfering with its pricefixing investigations. The DOJ indicted a Japanese carbon fiber company (along with its

173. AdvancedMicro Devices, 292 F.3d at 666.
174. See Texas Int'l Magnetics, Inc. v. BASF Aktiengesellschaft, 31 Fed. Appx. 738 (2d Cir. 2002) (allowing
a discovery to substantiate specific allegations that a U.S. company that had participated in an alleged unlawful
conspiracy had been merged with the foreign defendant); In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 2002-2 CCH Trade Cases 1 73,793, 94,482-85 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (allowing discovery by a plaintiff
alleging jurisdiction based on section 12 of the Clayton Act, in order to substantiate its allegations that the
defendants' contacts with the United States as a whole-as opposed to the relevant forum state-were sufficient
to subject it to U.S. jurisdiction; recognizing a split of authority as to whether Section 12 of the Clayton Act
permits an antitrust plaintiff to assert personal jurisdiction based on the defendant's "national contacts"). The
court in Automotive Refinishing also held that the plaintiff could not assert jurisdiction over the foreign defendant
based on the conduct of the defendant's U.S. subsidiary under the "alter ego" theory of jurisdiction, in part
because of the lack of representation by the defendant's employees on the subsidiary's board of directors. Id.
at 94,486.
175. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former President of Liechtenstein Co. Found Guilty of Rigging
Bids on U.S.-Funded Construction Contracts in Egypt (Feb. 12,2002), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2002/February/02_at_073.htm..
176. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Company Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $28.5 Million Fine for
Participating in Polyester Staple Cartel (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/
October/02_at_- 632.htm.
177. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, International Chemical Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty, Pay Fines
for Participating in Multiple Criminal Antitrust Conspiracies (Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/March/02-at 151 .htm.
178. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Japanese and German Companies to Plead Guilty and Pay Fines
for Role in International Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Apr. 1, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2002/april/O2_at_190.htm.
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U.S. subsidiary and a Japanese executive) for obstruction of justice in connection with the
DOJ's investigation of price fixing in the carbon fiber industry.7 The DOJ also secured a
plea agreement for witness tampering with a U.K.-based company whose U.S. subsidiary
was being investigated for an alleged price-fixing conspiracy involving electrical carbon
products.18 0
The DOJ continued to prosecute foreign nationals residing abroad who were accused of
violating U.S. antitrust laws. In connection with the monochloroacetic acid cartel investigation, two French executives from Elf Atochem S.A. agreed to plead guilty, serve ninetyday jail sentences in the United States, and pay criminal fines of $50,000 each.' The DOJ
also secured a plea agreement with a British executive for participating in the carbon cathode
block conspiracy182 and indicted83a Japanese executive and a German executive for their
alleged roles in that conspiracy.
C.

MERGER ENFORCEMENT

In 2002, the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) continued to examine international mergers affecting competition in the United States. Pursuant to the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,11 the DOJ and the FTC reviewed numerous
international mergers and, in some instances, entered into consent decrees to address potential anticompetitive effects.
The FTC entered into a consent agreement to resolve its objections to the proposed
$1.3 billion acquisition by Solvay S.A., a Belgian-based pharmaceutical and chemical manufacturer, of Auismont S.p.A., an Italian company primarily doing business in the fluorinated materials and peroxide industries.' The FTC believed that the transaction would
86
have lessened competition in certain markets related to polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF).'
179. See Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, Japanese Company, Its American Subsidiary, andJapanese Executive
Indicted for Obstruction of Justice (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/March/
02_at_162.htm.
180. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, U.S. Company And U.K. Parent To Plead Guilty To Charges
Involving An International Electrical Carbon Products Cartel (Nov. 4,2002), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2002/November/02_at 642.htm (the company agreed to pay a $ I million fine).
181. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, European Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty for Participating in an
International Antitrust Conspiracy (Aug. 7, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/
02_at_462.htm; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, International Chemical Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty, Pay
Fines for Participating in Multiple Criminal Antitrust Conspiracies (Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2002/1083 5.htm.
182. See Press Release, Dep't ofJustice, British Executives to Plead Guilty for their Role in an International
Price-fixing Conspiracy (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/September/
02_at_559.htm (two British nationals pled guilty, with the individual who did not reside in the U.S. agreeing
to pay a $28,000 fine).
183. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Japanese and German Executives Indicted for Their Roles in an
International Price-fixing Conspiracy (May 21, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/May/
02 at_304.htm.
184. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1997), amendedby Public
L. No. 106-553, 114 Star. 2762 (2000).
185. Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, FTC Settlement Would Preserve Competition in U.S. Market
for Fluoropolymer Resins (May 2, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/05/solvayausimont.htm
(Ausimont was a subsidiary of Italenergia S.p.A).
186. Id. The FTC believed that competition would be lessened because (i) the relevant markets were highly
concentrated and had significant barriers to entry, (ii) the transaction would unduly increase concentration,
and (iii) the transaction could make coordinated interaction more likely among the only two significant PVDF
producers that would remain post-transaction. Id. The FTC found coordination to be likely because reliable
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The consent agreement required Solvay to divest its U.S. PVDF operations (including its
Alabama plant), and to provide to the acquirer of the divested business (1) a royalty-free
license to Solvay's intellectual property, including the right to manufacture or sell PVDF
anywhere in the world, and (2) detailed information about Solvay's production of PVDF
at Solvay's plants in Alabama and France."87 The FTC also reported that it had cooperated
with the European Commission in the analysis of the transaction.'
After a review that lasted nearly ten months, the FTC declined to challenge two proposed
transactions in the cruise line industry: the proposed merger of Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd. and P&O Princess Cruises plc, and the competing hostile tender offer by Carnival
Corporation for Princess.8 9 The FTC took the unusual step of releasing a lengthy statement (Statement) regarding its decision not to challenge the transactions. 90° In its Statement, the FTC emphasized that it did not believe that either transaction would result in a
merger to duopoly because (1) at least one other major competitor existed (in addition to
the three parties), (2) a significant group of "fringe" competitors remained, and (3) there
was "considerable competitive interaction between the cruise industry and alternative vacation options."' 9 ' The FTC also reported that the EU and U.K. antitrust enforcement
agencies had also investigated the proposed transactions, and not challenged them. 91
The DOJ in 2002 also began to implement its own Merger Review Process Initiative,
which involves methods to make the initial waiting period more productive, streamline
Second Requests, and expedite the DOJ's assembling and analysis of information. 91
D.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The DOJ and FTC (Agencies) continued to engage in substantial cooperation with foreign antitrust enforcement authorities. Representatives from the Agencies attended the first
annual International Competition Network (ICN) conference, where they worked with
antitrust agencies from numerous foreign jurisdictions to facilitate reforms in multijuris94
The Agencies have also attempted to more fully articulate
dictional merger review.

pricing information is available from customers, and the large number of customers in the industry would make
cheating on any coordination easy to detect.
187. Id.

188. Id.
189. Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, FTC Closes Cruise Line Merger Investigations (Oct. 4,2002)
(HHI increase from 2800 to 3700), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/lO/cruiselines.htin.
190. Statement of Federal Trade Comm'n Concerning Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd./P&O Princess
Cruises plc and Carnival Corporation/P&O Princess Cruises plc, FTC File No. 021 0041, available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/cruisestatement.htm.
191. The Statement also recognized that the objections by competitors to the proposed transactions must
be received "with healthy dose of skepticism" given that "[olpposition to a merger from a competitor often
indicates that the transaction will increase-rather than decrease-competition." Id.
192. Id.
193. See Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of'Justice, Rediscovering
Coordinated Effects, Address Presented at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Section of Antitrust
Law (Aug. 13, 2002), at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200124.htm; Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Going Global in the 21st Century,
Remarks before Federal Bar Association Corporate and Association Counsels Division and American Corporation Counsel Association Northeast Ohio Chapter (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/speeches/200418.htm [hereinafter Mojoras].
194. See William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Global
Competition Convergence and Cooperation: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, Address Presented at the
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the fundamental principles that should guide competition law in an increasingly global
economy.'95
The Agencies continue to participate in the U.S.-EU Merger Working Group, and in
October 2002, the Agencies and the EU released "best practices" for coordinating merger
reviews of transactions subject to both U.S. and EU review.'9 6 The "best practices" are
intended to minimize the risk of divergent outcomes in each jurisdiction, facilitate the
coherence and compatibility of remedies, enhance the investigative efficiency of the reviews,
and reduce the burden on the transacting parties.' 97

American Bar Association Fall Forum (Nov. 7, 2002), at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200442.htn
[hereinafter Kolasky]; Majoras, supra note 193.
195. See, e.g., Kolasky, supra note 194; William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Global Competition: Prospects for Convergence and Cooperation, Remarks before
the American Bar Association Fall Forum (Nov. 7,2002), at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200446.htm.
196. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., United States and European Union Antitrust
Agencies Issue "Best Practices" for Coordinating Merger Reviews (Oct. 30, 2002), available at www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/press-releases/2002/200407.hm; Press Release, Federal Trade Comm'n, United States and European Union Antitrust Agencies Issue "Best Practices" for Coordinating Merger Reviews (Oct. 30, 2002), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/10/euguidelines.htm.
197. See Majoras, supra note 193.
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